, has 'showed little interest in long-term memory in general and no interest whatsoever in autobiographical memory ' (p. 16) .
Happily, this situation has significantly changed, and interest in such memory is much expanded (see Neisser & Fivush, 1994; Rubin, 1996) . That said, while the computer metaphor has shed much light on memory in general, autobiographical memory may lie outside of the circle that it illuminates (Lampinen et al., 2004, p. 256) . In the house of memory, of course, many metaphors have resided across the centuries, however implicitly they have been employed. Among them are bank, which underlies Wilhelm Mader's (1996) notion of 'biographical capital' (p. 43); and library, which fits with homely images of The Book of Life or The Pages of Time. Then there is deceiver, such as we find lurking in the poet P.K. Page's (1994) references to memory as a 'trickster figure' who 'will let you down-a fiction writer offering alternate versions of what you had once imagined written in stone: the immutable facts of your life ' (p. 58) . Also, there is pathway, as in 'memory lane'; and even vagabond, inasmuch as memory has been described as 'a crazy woman that hoards coloured rags and throws away food' (Austin O'Malley, 1858 -1932 ).
An exhaustive review of the role of metaphor in more formal conceptions of memory is beyond my scope here; indeed, the mere acknowledgement of that role will, in some circles, be resisted (see Kenyon, Birren, & Schroots, 1991) . The work of scholars such as Douwe Draaisma (2000) is therefore salient in this regard. Tracing 'a narrative which runs from Plato to today's designers of neural networks' (p. 4), Draaisma demonstrates how 'the churnings of the metaphor mill,' as he terms it, 'have projected constantly changing images of our representations of memory ' (p. 230) . From wax tablet to magic slate to aviary or warehouse, to 'a forest in which our recollection hunted for the trail of hidden game,' metaphors, he says, 'have given shape to views and interpretations of memory ' (p. 230) . Over the centuries, however, these metaphors 'acquire an increasingly technical character ' (p. 230) .
As a conceptual tool, any metaphor both aids us and impedes us, of course, in our understanding of whatever it is that we use it to conceive. In Draaisma's words, 'with each new metaphor we place a different filter in front of our perception of memory ' (p. 230) . But some metaphors, we could say, have aided us (and impeded us?) more powerfully than others. A case in point is computationalism, according to which the dynamics of cognitionincluding memory-are not merely likened to, but virtually equated with, the operations of a computer, a trend that turns up time after time. Observing that the psychology of memory not only 'obtained a close connection with technological developments' but 'also derived status from it' (p. 231), Draaisma notes how, 'reflected in theory,' memory 'came to look like the technologies it was modelled on' (p. 231). Our conceptions of memory, he reiterates, 'are always mixed with the technologies used as metaphors and appear to change completely with each successive image ' (p. 233) . When it comes to computationalism, this is hardly surprising, considering the meteoric rise of computer technology, by whose increasingly sophisticated forms few corners of our lives have failed to be improved. However, even though it continues to flourish in various quarters-witness Stephen Pinker's (1997) explication of 'how the mind works' and recent research into 'narrative intelligence' (Mateas & Sengers, 2000) -computationalism has become, in several sectors, the target of a growingly vocal critique.
Referring to the 'widespread belief ... in many scientific circles ... that the brain is a computer,' neurobiologist Gerald Edelman (2006) insists that 'this belief is mistaken,' for a number of reasons, principal among which are that 'the brain does not operate by logical rules ' (p. 21) . Jerome Bruner (1996) , a founder of cognitive science itself, yet, coincidentally, a key figure in the emergence of narrative psychology, challenges the ability of 'informationprocessing' to account for 'the messy, ambiguous, and context-sensitive processes of meaning-making' (p. 5). Psychologist Daniel Goleman (1995) , author of the popular book Emotional Intelligence, asserts that cognitive scientists have been so 'seduced by the computer as the operative model of mind' (pp. 40f.) that they have forgotten that, 'in reality, the brain's wetware is awash in a messy, pulsating puddle of neurochemicals' (p. 40f.) which is 'nothing like the sanitized, orderly silicon that has spawned the guiding metaphor for mind ' (pp. 40-41) . Then there is the acerbic observation of philosopher John Searle (1998): It is one of the great intellectual achievements of the 20th century that we are able to do so much with such a simple apparatus, but equally it is one of the great intellectual mistakes of the latter part of the 20th century to suppose that that is what is going on in our minds. (p. 7) As for what goes in our minds when we remember, autobiography scholar James Olney (1998) maintains that 'there are no predictive, computational procedures adequate to the indeterminacy and complexity of human memory, consciousness, and the self' (p. 372). In his book Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, Edward Casey (1987) , who insists that 'to remember ... is to become enmeshed in the thicket of the past' (p. 266), echoes Olney's concern by decrying the 'mathematization' of memory and declaring that 'human memory is impugned ... by being analogized to something that remembers more efficiently than do human beings themselves' (p. 5). Indeed it is the very inefficiency of memory that cries out loudest for a more appropriate analogy. Says Draaisma (2000) bluntly, 'the memory of the computer is too good'; its 'infallibility is its principal short-coming' (p. 161). According to memory researcher Daniel Schacter, who openly confesses the sins of memory (Schacter, 2001) , the computer analogy 'leaves no room for the subjective experience of remembering incidents and episodes from our pasts' (Schacter, 1996, p. 16 ). As such, it leaves limited room for the dynamic complexity that can characterize reminiscence, a mode of remembering by which psychologists of aging are understandably intrigued (see Webster & Haight, 2002) .
Despite these various critiques, plus the fact that its dominant role in conceptualizing its creator (the human mind) puts one in mind of the tail wagging the dog, the computer metaphor has done us one very vital service. It has led us to the point where we can appreciate that it has its limits; that, as clever as computers have unquestionably become, there are aspects of memory which they can never quite reflect, aspects that in fact the humanities-my own moorings, ultimately-may be as well positioned as the sciences to appreciate and explore. Over 20 years ago, Howard Gardner (1985) gave this phenomenon a name. It is the computational paradox: 'Only through scrupulous adherence to computational thinking,' he writes, 'could scientists discover the ways in which humans actually differ from the serial digital computer' (p. 385). To me, it is in relation to autobiographical memory, especially its narrative dimensions, that those differences are probably starkest. It is because of such dimensions that I find the compost heap so enticing, in spite of impressive attempts to fathom them with, when all is said and done, a computer still behind the scenes.
One thinks, for instance, of the work of Roger Schank in his book Tell Me a Story (1990) . Referring essentially to autobiographical memory, Schank insists that it is 'story-based' (p. 12). It 'is memory for stories,' he says, 'and the major processes of memory are the creation, storage, and retrieval of stories' (p. 16). To comprehend 'intelligence,' insists Schank, best known for his focus on artificial intelligence, 'we must understand the role that stories play in memory. We must know how events become stories and how these stories are stored and later retrieved' (p. 16). As intriguing as I find it, Schank's perspective still portrays memory, and, along with it, story-making, in much too logical and mechanical a manner. What is needed instead is a metaphor that fits, if not dignifies, the messiness of memory, and that accommodates, if not requires, its various failures, including the amnesia that all of us have for our earliest childhood and the everyday forgetfulness that infects our recollections of even the most recent occurrences. We need a metaphor that is suitably organic to account for those aspects of memory that, like the brain itself, resemble a 'pulsating puddle' and that, in the end, are not so much about the past per se as they are present and alive. So, with my tongue not a little in my cheek and a hunch much more than a hypothesis exercising my mind, I will proceed to make a case for the common compost heap-so opposite from the computer in so many respects-as my metaphor of choice for what on earth memory is about. Despite its (I feel) intuitive appeal, I do not for a second, of course, suppose that either it or any other metaphor can capture everything about autobiographical memory. Yet, at the very least, perhaps it can nudge us from our continuing allegiance to computation, with the limits it inevitably involves, in the process shedding light on aspects of memory that are otherwise eclipsed.
Gerontology: A Growing Concern
Before I plough on, let me say more about gerontology in general and narrative gerontology in particular. Gerontology, which is devoted to the study of human aging from numerous angles-psychological, social, physiological, philosophical-is a field which, sooner or later, all of us grow into, whether we want to or not. The multiple topics it treats are ones which, as we age, more and more of us will be living: from hair loss to role loss, pensions to prostates, retirement to bereavement, dementia to dying. But while gerontology is therefore a multi-disciplinary field (Katz, 1996) , aging itself is an inter-disciplinary experience, and begs to be looked at from every conceivable side.
An aging individual myself, I am increasingly interested in the often-overlooked inside of aging , which is to say, its subjective or 'biographical' dimensions (Birren, Kenyon, Ruth, Schroots, & Svensson, 1996) , to distinguish them, for example, from its biological dimensions. In terms of the latter, aging is portrayed as a process of deterioration which renders us progressively weaker, slower, and shorter-up to 2 inches' worth in fact (which is to say, progressively more 'down to earth'). In consequence, aging is construed at the individual and societal levels alike in terms of a 'narrative of decline' (Gullette, 2004) , the end of which is death. Yet in terms of a narrative gerontology (see Kenyon, Clark, & de Vries, 2001) , which views human beings as fundamentally meaning-making, story-telling creatures, a cluster of questions arise that help to cast aging in a more positive and creative light, as a matter of what anthropologist-educator-feminist Mary Catherine Bateson (1989) calls 'composing a life. ' To date, mainstream gerontology has been dominated by the so-called 'medical model' and by a positivist-empiricist paradigm that takes essentially an 'outside-in' approach to aging , drawing only minimally on insights from the humanities. As such, it has been unaccustomed to asking, let alone conceiving, the kinds of questions to which I am referring, among which are: What is the relationship between our lives and the stories by which we understand them? Why is it that of the thousands of events that we might have remembered over a life-time, it is these and not those that persist; moreover, that they are interpreted-or storied-in this way and not that? What inner editor weeds the chaff from the wheat, in other words, and by what criteria is the weeding guided? Furthermore, what are the effects upon our 'life stories' (McAdams, 1996) in general of the various narrative environments in which, over the years, those stories have been co-authored (Holstein & Gubrium, 2000) ? As well, how do our memories and stories change with the passage of time, and what is the role of such change in our overall 'narrative development' (Freeman, 1994; Ray, 2000) ? And how might the meanings that we fashion through the stories that we compose accumulate inside of us, increasing in complexity and depth to become a rich inner resource that can sustain us and nourish us in the course of actually growing older?
Equipped with a conception of memory that can more comfortably accommodate these narrative dimensions-and a compost heap, I feel, possesses that advantage-we are positioned to visualize later life in more optimistic terms. We are permitted to perceive it not merely as a stage when we are plagued by cognitive 'deficits,' by the loss of 'information,' or by 'processing' problems, but as one that presents us with a unique opportunity for personal growth; as a time when wisdom is an attainable 'potential' (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986) ; and as a period for sharing that wisdom-through sharing our memories and our stories-with others, thereby contributing to their growth too. While the metaphor I am favouring might seem, on the surface, to do little more than underscore the idea of aging as decline, it must not be forgotten that within the average compost heap lurks tremendous potential for life. Thus it is that composing a life and composting a life may be one and the same.
Composting a Life
Before getting into the specifics of a compost heap, we can benefit from a quick survey of some broad blood differences between it and a computer, with an eye to each as a metaphor for memory and to the 'entailments' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) which each implies.
Where computers are mechanical-electrical in nature, compost heaps are as natural as can be. Where computers are recent inventions, indeed the pride of human ingenuity, compost heaps lack the lustre and dazzle of newness. As the saying goes, they are 'as old as the hills.' Where computers are about the processing of information, compost heaps are about the producing of ... compost. Where the former are fundamentally sterile, the latter are fertile, by definition. Computers do what we instruct them to do, passively, as it were, whereas compost heaps do what they do primarily on their own, with very much a life of their own. Where computers are plagued by virtual bugs and virtual viruses, compost heaps are abetted by real bugs and real bacteria, and they do what they do in 'real time,' or, more accurately, their own sweet time. Computers run by complex, but essentially linear-logical, processes, whereas compost heaps, no less complicated, run by intertwining biochemical processes. Computers are about ordered activities whereas compost heaps are about what, in contrast, seems far more chaotic. Indeed, they are not 'organized' so much as 'organic,' in large part because their hardware and software are effectively one. To continue, all of the files stored in the memory of a computer are, in principle, equally retrievable, no matter when they were composed. Moreover, the information contained in them is preserved precisely as it was when the file was last edited and saved. With a compost model of memory, however, recollections of more recent events-or what remains of those recollections-are generally more retrievable, since they are, after all, nearer to the top. Meanwhile, events which happened further back are buried deeper down. And the deeper they lie, the less retrievable they are likely to be.
RANDALL: FROM COMPUTER TO COMPOST
On some level, of course, a computer and a compost heap may have something critical in common. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) , for example, contrast two over-riding families of memory metaphors: 'correspondence' metaphors and 'storehouse' metaphors. The latter can be traced as far back as Plato, and has been reinforced by John Locke's view of memory 'as the storehouse of our ideas ... a repository to lay up those ideas' (as cited in Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996, p. 4) . The storehouse metaphor, they argue, 'has had a pervasive impact on the mainstream of traditional memory research,' and 'directed researchers' thinking towards such aspects of memory as storage capacity, the internal architecture of the store ... and, of course, information loss' (p. 5). It is into this category, then, that the computer clearly fits. Although, compared to earlier storehouse metaphors, it 'adds greater sophistication,' it nonetheless 'has served primarily to reinforce the fundamental storehouse features-the input, storage, and retrieval of discrete units of information' (p. 5). Koriat and Goldsmith go on to argue that 'the "pure" strain of storehouse metaphor has evolved into a variety of related species,' some of which 'imply the stacking of items in layers, one on top of the other, so that "buried" items are more difficult to reach' (p. 5)-an image which, clearly, the compost heap reflects. My argument, however, would be that while, yes, 'storage' of sorts is involved-in the form more of silage, that is-a compost heap is not merely a mushier or danker version of a computer. It is a different species altogether. Ultimately, it is not a thing but a process. Witness how frequently 'compost' is employed as a verb. To me, the process entails four overlapping phases which, lacking more sophisticated terminology, can be called laying it on, breaking it down, stirring it up, and mixing it in. No doubt a fifth phase is happening as well, insofar as at every point in the composting process the heap needs time to do what it does with a minimum of interference. Though not dealt with here, one could perhaps label it letting it be.
Laying It On
Laying it on, one might say, runs roughly parallel to 'encoding,' or, to use the more off-putting term, 'inputting.' Applied to memory, it involves stripping the events of our lives-at least those events to which our senses grant us access-from what we can immediately use of them or consume from them or otherwise take in from them, and throwing the rest on the compost heap. In a sense, we are laying it on incessantly, mindlessly almost, every waking minute. As Fitzgerald (1986) reminds us, the whole process happens 'without the benefit of conscious memory goal activities' (p. 122). Indeed, 'it is this lack of conscious control,' he says, that requires use of 'the term involuntary in characterizing most autobiographical memories' (p. 122). As a result, the actual contents of our memories can seem surprisingly random. The writer Thomas Wolfe (1938 /1983 refers, for instance, to the bits and pieces that made up his own memory and upon which he drew rather liberally in (Schank, 1990) , or into normal knowledge that everyone knows-episodes that cannot be absorbed into 'repisodes' (Neisser, 1986, p. 79) . We are unlikely to recall all of the times when we have ridden in a taxi, only those in which something unusual occurred: the driver told us the story of his life, we got caught in a parade, we got proselytized or mugged. Some of these episodes we could call 'signature stories' (Kenyon & Randall, 1997) , which is to say, stories that are particularly tellable to others because they convey something significant about us as persons and about the distinctive perspective from which we experience the world. In sum, we tend not to form stories about the 'same old, same old' but about what is different or odd or new. As a consequence, 'most of our experiences and perceptions,' as one source expresses it (Stone, 2005) , 'flow into the amorphous black hole that we call our past, never to be recalled, reflected on, or evaluated ' (p. 179 (and how) and what gets forgotten, is a question for another paper, which might require envisioning some entirely new category, such as 'the gardener and/or editor within.' But it is a question to which discussions of 'identity' might suggest some answers. Dan McAdams (1996) , for instance, talks about the 'pre-mythic' phase of our narrative development when, largely unconsciously, we are 'gathering material' for what, during the 'mythic' phase, which begins in adolescence, will emerge as our 'life story'-which is what, for him, our identity is. The development of this life story-identity is a primary factor behind the 'reminiscence bump' (Rubin, Rahlal, & Poon, 1998) , where a disproportionate cluster of an older person's memories pertain to the period between, say, 18 and 30 years of age. It stands to reason. Amid those years, one is wrestling with all manner of identity-determining, story-shaping issues, from leaving home to pursuing a career to developing a RANDALL: FROM COMPUTER TO COMPOST 619 long-term, intimate relationship. Thus, the emergence of one's 'self-concept plays a critical role in autobiographical memory' (Howe, 2004, p. 45) . At the same time, the emergence of one's autobiographical memory plays a critical role in one's self-concept. We remember what is important to our self, but how we see our self depends on what we remember. In Casey's words (1987) , ' we are what we remember ourselves to be' (p. 290).
Memory, in any case, is where we consign 'the remnants of time' (Cole & Winkler, 1994, p. 31) or what Casey (1987) calls the 'unresolved remainder' (p. 266). Whether positive or negative in nature, what we remember is 'built from fragments of experience' (Schacter, 1996, p. 42 ) that refuse to fade away. Put simply, it is refuse. This presents a paradox. How is it, asks Schacter (1996) , that something as central as our sense of self, 'the foundation of our psychological existence, depends crucially on these fragmentary and often elusive remnants of experience' (p. 40)? Although he would argue that 'our memory systems do a remarkably good job of preserving the general contours of our pasts and of recording correctly many of the important things that have happened to us' (p. 308), the issue remains a haunting one.
In a provocative article entitled 'Literary and Psychological Models of the Self, ' Daniel Albright (1994) asserts that 'the remembered self is like Kafka's wall, consisting more of holes than of bricks' (p. 23). Such an assertion makes an interesting counterpoint to the claim made by Nietzsche that 'life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness' (as cited in Casey, 1987, p. 2) . Certainly, to maintain a manageable sense of self, forgetting is essential; a point which, ironically perhaps, is seldom noted in discussions of dementia. Too many memories can be as tragic as too few. Consider Shereshevski, the mnemonist studied extensively by A.R. Luria. Shereshevski 'formed and retained highly detailed memories of virtually everything that happened to him-both the important and the trivial. Yet he was unable to function at an abstract level because he was inundated with unimportant details of his experiences' (Schacter, 2001, p. 190) . '[S]uch a person, ' Luria (1968 ' Luria ( /1987 cautiously concludes, 'cannot mature in the same way others do, nor will his inner world, his life history, tend to be like others ' (p. 151) .
Putting this paradox aside, except to acknowledge that 'the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self can be rather complex' (Wagenaar, 1994, p. 191) , let us return to the realities of actual compost heaps. As for the standard garden variety, it consists largely of leftovers-egg shells, onion skins, coffee grounds, potato peelings, dead leaves, clippings from the rosebush, cuttings from the lawn: whatever we do not or will not eat, or digest, or otherwise process by natural means-whatever is biodegradable in nature. In a proper compost heap, meat scraps are forbidden since they attract rodents and rot in the wrong sorts of ways, and rocks will not degrade at all. As a metaphor for memory, however, it is not really a pure compost heap that maybe we ought to have in mind: the kind which a good gardener sets out deliberately to build, known in gardening circles as 'hot composting.' 620 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17 (5) Rather, the compost heap of most of us is somewhat haphazardly attended to, and is probably part-rockpile, -stockpile, and -manure pile too, and part-junkyard and -garbage dump, which means that its smell may leave much to be desired. To put it very crudely, some memories stink. Pure compost or not, hot compost or cold, over time the past 'develops' inside of us (Casey, 1987, p. 275) . It literally piles up. In Casey's terms, it is 'sedimented in layers,' giving it 'concentrated emotional significance' as well as 'temporal density and historical depth: a depth not easily penetrable by the direct light of consciousness' (p. 265). To put the point another way, the plot-the tiny plot that is our particular existence-continually and steadily thickens. Indeed, 'progressive thickening' (p. 264), one could argue, is the hallmark of human memory.
To return to the matter of who is minding the store-or the storying-of our memories, what we select to 'hang onto' is partly determined by the 'forms of self-telling' (Bruner, 1987, p. 16) we have adopted from the various narrative environments in which our lives have been shaped: our family, culture, gender, creed, and so on. Within these environments, with their 'rules for self-accounting' (Gergen, 1994, p. 90) and their unwritten codes for selecting, summarizing, and 'spinning' our experiences, we absorb a set of assumptions as to what is valuable, meaningful, and therefore memorable in our lives. For better or worse, we learn what is worth remembering and what may be forgotten. We learn what sorts of stories merit telling and retaining, and what do not. In this respect, a type of encoding does indeed occur as the inner editorgardener decides which items to consign to the compost heap, commencing with our experience of being embedded in a particular family. It is there, as one source puts it, that 'we learn the family genre: the thematics, the stylistic requirements, the lexicon ... procedures for offering justifications and making excuses, and the rest of it' (Bruner & Weisser, 1991, p. 141) . To put the point more sharply, and as a growing body of literature on the social construction of memory and personal narrative clearly supports, we seldom lay down the material in our memories entirely by ourselves, nor is that material necessarily about us alone. In fact, what we think are our memories are sometimes others' memories about us, incidents we have overheard them refer to yet unwittingly claimed as our own. In all, it is typically by means of 'memory talk' in our relationships with others, beginning with mothers and fathers (Eakin, 1999; Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996; Fivush & Reese, 2002; Gergen, 1994) , that we are initially tutored in interpreting our lives: in what to keep in our compost heaps and what to keep out.
Breaking It Down
This stage, along with letting it be, is a kind of counterpart to 'storage.' But as a matter of silage more than storage, it is by no means some calm, quiet, passive phase. During it, much-or, dare one say, mulch-is going on. A more apt term is decaying. Indeed, some memory researchers have coined the term 'decay theory' (Rubin, 1986 ) to encompass what is happening. Of course, by no means do all of our memories decompose, or at least not dramatically or entirely; indeed, many seem to stand the test of time rather well and constitute the unresolved remainder, the fragments of experience, around which, across the years, our more 'self-defining' memories (Singer & Blagov, 2004) tend to be formed. But insofar as 'change and decay' affect many of our memories, sooner or later, we are not referring here to physiologically based, pathological deterioration, such as occurs with Alzheimer's and other dementias. Rather, we are referring to normal decay. In a passage where he is considering the transformation of much of our episodic memory into, eventually, semantic memory, Schank (1990) refers to memory's 'dynamic nature' (p. 122). By this he means, 'actual experiences are constantly being broken up into their component pieces and are being added to general event memory bit by bit in different places,' such that 'no coherent whole remains.' He goes on: 'Breaking up our daily experiences into their component parts is terribly important. If we did not, we would never learn anything cross-contextually' (p. 122).
Breaking it down is where the compost heap parts company with the computer, if it was ever in the same camp to begin with. For this is the heart of what heaps are about: an ever further fuzzying of the edges between individual items, such that, at some point, a slice of rotting tomato merges with a leaf of soggy lettuce on one side and a bit of blue-green orange rind on the other. In autobiographical memory, the boundaries between individual 'events' can be similarly blurred, with the exact chronology that links them together being the first of many casualties-'historical truth' (Spence, 1982) being another. For one thing, there is considerable cross-'indexing' (Schank, 1990, pp. 84ff .) among them. Initial interpretations of particular incidents are labelled in multiple ways and thus can be recalled by a variety of prompts. As an example, the phrase 'elementary school' floods my mind with images: playing ball behind the schoolhouse; being hit on the head with a textbook by Heather Corey, on whom I had a horrible crush; getting into a fist-fight with my nemesis, Sidney Rosborough; walking up the hill on the first day of school, sad about the end of summer yet excited about the year ahead. As well, certain events will be 'nested' within other, larger ones (Neisser, 1986) , muddling ever more the relationships among them. Heather memories are nested within school memories, school memories within childhood memories, and so forth.
Breaking it down brings us to one of memory's cardinal sins: transience, which Schacter (2001, pp. 12ff.) defines as the gradual 'degrading' of 'information.' Though uncomfortable with the concept of 'information,' I take 'degrading' as a synonym for decaying, which, as mentioned, is as integral to a compost heap as forgetting is to remembering. No decaying, no composting-end of story. It is due to this decaying, of course, that compost heaps can acquire their distinctive odeur, at least the laissez-faire variety I am imagining here, not the kind that is deliberately tended. In his popular book Care of 622 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17 (5) the Soul, author Thomas Moore (1992) tells us that the past 'often lies shrouded in a cloud of melancholy, an emotion that is appropriate to memory as the musty odor of decay to old furniture and buildings ' (pp. 8-9) . Melancholy, he says, putting an optimistic twist on the matter, is 'an emotional mustiness that signals the presence of soul' (p. 9). One last point: as things break down, they also heat up. A proper compost heap is a hothouse of fermentation, a feature it is hard to envision the hardware of one's computer possessing and still being able to function. Some memories simmer inside us for years. So charged are they, so powerful or painful, that they resist even minimal degradation, including the horrific memories that Holocaust scholar Lawrence Langer (1991) describes, for instance, as 'anguished,' 'humiliated,' or 'tainted.' Merge though they might with neighbouring events, at least at their fringes, they retain much of their original identity. A good strong remnant remains. They defy 'assimilation' into what might, otherwise and overall, be deemed a 'coherent' life story (Coleman, 1999) . Many such memories are of happy or humorous events that we have recited so often that they have become 'set pieces' (Chandler & Ray, 2002) in our narrative repertoire. But others are decades-old memories that continue to fester at the centre of the heap, oozing acrid fumes that can foul our environment and contaminate our lives.
Stirring It Up
Broadly speaking, this phase could be taken as a counterpart to retrieval. Stirring it up involves periodically, sometimes radically, churning the contents of the compost heap so that what was on the top is shifted toward the bottom, and vice versa. It is literally the re-cycling of the compost heap, and it is how we give it the air that it requires to do its breaking down. As a metaphor for what goes on in memory, stirring it up is involved whenever we re-view the past, revisiting and revising our interpretation of particular events, re-membering or re-collecting them, or just generally 'turning things over in our minds'-a process of 'slow ingestion,' as Casey calls it (1987, p. 275) , for which he reserves the term 'ruminiscence' (p. 156). Memory theorists increasingly agree that every act of remembering is a reconstructing of the past, not a straightforward recollection of it, but always a reinterpretation. And as it comes to the top of our mind it trails behind it all manner of other possible interpretations of which, one could argue, we are on some level always aware, a phenomenon associated with what Casey refers to as 'the thick autonomy of memory ' (pp. 262ff.) .
Another image that comes to mind is of a continual reshuffling and rearranging of memory material not unlike what occurs with the turning of a kaleidoscope-or a cement mixer, for that matter. But here is the key: The Past is never cast in concrete. Even our set pieces take on a slightly different twist with each new telling, depending upon the context. Each context, and RANDALL: FROM COMPUTER TO COMPOST 623 each audience, will have an impact on the telling to some degree, however tiny, and with the telling, our interpretation of whatever originally took place, plus our assessment of its significance in our memory as a whole. In discussing this process from a developmental perspective, Fitzgerald (1986) refers to it as a 'transaction' whereby 'an individual can change his memories and his memories can change the person as they provide a part of the context for interpreting experience' (p. 127). In Albright's (1994) more literary way of putting things, 'past events do not lie brightly, overtly before our gaze, but are instead swaddled in a thick tissue of prior recalls and prior recallers, each adding colors and shadows to the original' (p. 36).
This captures something essential about both the layeredness of autobiographical memory and its narrative complexity, which can be appreciated when we consider what happens in reading a novel. As we go from beginning to end, we experience successive understandings of what sort of story we are reading, of where it is leading and what it all means, with each understanding being superseded by the next, though never entirely. We never quite shake off our memories of previous understandings; and their accumulation inside of us, as 'a kind of sedimentary layer of insights and impressions,' as literary commentator Sven Birkerts (1994, p. 197) refers to it, lends not just 'temporal density' to our experience of reading but intellectual, hermeneutical, and emotional density as well (Randall & McKim, in press ).
The past, we may take from all of this, is never the same past but to some degree, at every stage in our narrative development, a different one. Even when it seems we are letting it be, it is changing within us. Each telling of it is done in the light of a particular present and what appears a particular future-and, indeed, from the standpoint of rather different selves (Bruner, 1994) in continual dialogue with one another 'like interacting characters in a story' (Hermans, 2002, p. 148) . And since our sense of our present and our future is itself in continual flux, so is our sense of the past-of what it was and what it means. Put differently, the 'I' who remembers a given event is a different 'I' with every act of remembering, and our images of the past, present, and future that constitute the context in which that remembering takes place are never quite the same. In such ways we are continually 'rewriting the self' (Freeman, 1994) .
By the same token, the sheer weight of each layer of events that is thrown onto the heap increasingly compresses the past as a whole, and that compression itself-that continuous 'settling' which accompanies the 'thickening'-contributes to the change in our recollection of any one event. Thus, no matter how slightly, the past is forever being worked upon within us, despite the view of depth psychologist Ira Progoff (1975) that 'under the pressure of events, our lives become hard packed like soil that has not been tilled for many years' (p. 99). Progoff's point is worth taking when we remember the relentlessness with which laying on occurs. As he puts it:
… one experience is added to another so rapidly that we have neither time nor opportunity to consider their implications, nor the possibilities they open.… They pile up and are pressed tightly together inside of us, leaving no room in between for the fresh air of consciousness to enter, nor for something new to grow. (pp. 99-100) My own point would be that while, yes, many corners of our compost heaps can be extremely 'hard packed' and seem entirely resistant to stirring up, every act of telling is at the same time a tilling. Every act of putting some portion of our life into storied form-every act of storying the material of our memory-is a stirring up of the compost heap, even if it is material we have recounted a thousand times before in ways that, to those who know us best, sound boringly the same. While much of our self-telling concerns what is on the surface, some storyings will stir things up profoundly. Yet we never know in advance when we may be enticed, or obliged, to venture deeper, as experts in involuntary memory are certainly aware. There is no predicting what prompt-a sight, a sound, a scent-might drive the fork far down into the heap and turn up who knows what hitherto un-or under-storied material might be lying there inside of us, including certain 'sleeping dogs,' of course, which, once we have awakened them, we might wish we had let them be. In a more positive vein, the prompt could come from re-reading old books that transport us back to some previous period in our lives (Birkerts, 1994; Lesser, 2002) ; reading things in new books that do the same; pawing through photo albums; hearing a tune, old or new, that triggers ancient memories, planting an idea or sparking a feeling that, if only for a second, puts a fresh spin on something that we went through long ago but never quite 'resolved,' an overall process which gerontologists Sally Chandler and Ruth Ray (2002) refer to as 'dynamic reminiscence. ' Stirring up could also be the consequence-and often the cause-of undergoing a 'perspective transformation' (Mezirow, 1978) of, say, a religious or political nature; of meeting old friends or making new ones; of moving into different narrative environments, or of having a conversation with anyone in fact. It could occur as a result of hearing the news, of being asked a question that gets us thinking along untried lines, or of being presented with individual phrases that prompt surprising recollections. And it could happen by allowing ourselves to ponder the application to our own life of a particular story, theme, or image-or a particular metaphor. Construed as a compost heap, that is, memory is endlessly sensitive to metaphorical suggestion, a point that will be appreciated by those conversant with the use of, say, guided imagery as an educational or therapeutic tool. A phrase like love is a game, for instance, or marriage is a prison could churn up all manner of incidents from our earlier lives, and, with them, all sorts of emotions, the more so as we age. The longer we live, in other words, the more we lay down, and the more there will be to stir us up. In sum, there are countless means by which stirring up occurs, whether shallow or deep in degree. Many are by happenstance, for sure, but some are intentional in nature, the most obvious being what takes place in the 'retrieval environment' (Schacter, 1996, p. 107) of psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. We may seldom deliberately determine which events we will form memories of in the heat of their original occurrence, but in certain contexts we can quite consciously decide to re-assess (to re-member) memories that, as it were, are already there. Such contexts include returning to school, embarking on a new project, writing a memoir, or otherwise composing and re-composing our lives in a more or less mindful, intentional manner-a process of, so to speak, reading our lives (Randall & Kenyon, 2002; Randall & McKim, in press ). Nonetheless, most of that re-composing, I would suggest, occurs quite unintentionally inside of us, quietly yet constantly, amidst our daily lives as, memory-wise, we let things be.
Mixing It In
We could think of this phase as a parallel, of sorts, to 'networking'; to computers being linked with other computers in, eventually, a worldwide web. But where computers can be linked virtually and electronically, compost heaps can be linked actually and organically. Mixing it in concerns the process of fertilization; it means putting the compost to good use throughout the flower patch, facilitating growth. This links it with the concept of generativity. For Erikson (1968) , generativity means contributing in some way or other to the next generation, whether by having or parenting children, or, more broadly, by passing along something of value to those who succeed us; 'giving something back' to our community, our society, our world. Here, then, we are stepping outside of the individual domain-where the compost heap of a person's memory might be seen as an island, peculiar to one's unique collection of experiences-and moving into the 'communal' domain (Gergen, 1992, p. 163) .
But where generativity pertains more to the latter half of life, as indeed a key developmental 'task' (McAdams, 1996) , the phase at issue here, like the others, is happening all life long. By growing up in families and having our life stories co-authored through countless subsequent relationships, we are, in effect, forever mixing our lives with others' lives, such that where their worlds begin and our world ends is technically impossible to say. To quote Kenneth and Mary Gergen (1983) , our life-narratives are 'interknit.' Over time, not just in our intimate relationships but beyond them too, we become more and more enmeshed in one another's stories. To paraphrase Tennyson in his poem 'Ulysses ' (1842/1996) , we are part of all that we have met, as surely they are part of us. To take this idea to the extreme, and thinking of the earth in general as one vast compost heap, then everyone's individual heap is intermingled, sooner or later, with that of everyone else. Such an image leads me even further in the unorthodox direction I have been journeying so far.
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THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17 (5) With advancing age, I am increasingly conscious of the cycles of nature. Living in a land of four distinct seasons, I find this awareness easy to come by: a sense of things dying so that other things can come to life, only to die in their own turn, and, in their dying, make it possible for other things to live. When we speak of mixing it in in relation to autobiographical memory, we are speaking, essentially, of harvesting our past, however fuzzied and decayed much of its material may be. We are speaking of spreading our story around, imparting to others the 'ordinary wisdom' (Randall & Kenyon, 2001 ) to which our own little life bears witness, or, in general, finding a way to convey to the wider community what lessons we have learned from our sojourn through the years. One of the most obvious means of doing this, though not necessarily the easiest, is by telling our story, no matter how complex or patchy, pointless or tragic it might feel to us to be. The telling need not be public or published or announced with great fanfare; it can happen in quiet, gentle ways in soulful conversations with whoever is willing to listen. But in the telling, both we and our listeners will inevitably be changed, for surely in sharing our memories we are stirring things up.
Perhaps a more personal perspective is appropriate to conclude. A few years ago, after much prodding from his children, my 80-something father finally wrote his autobiography. Once he had completed it, however, my sisters and I persuaded him to go one step further and draw upon his talents as a family genealogist to outline the stories of our forebears-the Randalls, Rings, and Roberts-whose lineage, reaching back hundreds of years, he had taken pains to chart. By writing the book in which this labour of love resulted, he gave something extremely precious back to us. He gave us a deepened sense of our 'roots,' a feeling for the larger story in which we are inevitably embedded, thick with the narratives of numberless antecedents, whose genes and experiences underlie our own. Here, then, story merges with history, itself sedimented in layers (Freeman, 2002) , where our lives are grounded in, and nourished by, the lives of countless folk before us.
Compostscript
With a nod to Kierkegaard (1846 Kierkegaard ( /1941 , this 'compostscript' is both unconcluding and unscientific. (Perhaps the reader will have arrived at a similar assessment.) It is unconcluding because we are talking here about the perpetual mystery of Life. It is unscientific to the degree we are departing from the social sciences per se and moving more into the humanities, on the one hand, and, in a sense, the life sciences, on the other. That is to say, by means of the compost heap, insights into memory from the social science side might find a measure of convergence with those from the natural sciences too, in a space where one can explore not just the psychology of memory but the neurology, the physiology (Damasio, 1999) , and perhaps the botany of it as well.
The gist of the computational paradox is that the computer takes us only so far. Though much less chic or sleek, the compost heap has the potential to take us farther down certain paths by providing what may make, in several ways, a more fitting analogy for the memory that we have of our selves, especially its narrative complexity, a complexity that increases in countless ways with time. While the compost heap, at least in terms of the breaking down phase, might seem to underline the reality of relentless decay where memory is concerned, the story it recounts by no means ends there. All phases considered, I would submit, it can better account for the continual de-construction and re-construction, de-composition and re-composition, de-storying and re-storying for which memory is renowned. Plus, it can do better justice to the co-authoring, co-composing quality of our personal stories, which we narrate or read not ultimately in a vacuum but rather in and through our relationships with others, with whose memories our own can be hopelessly mixed. (That's not how it happened! 'Tis too. 'Tis not.) In ways that I fear a computer cannot, even a computer that is internet-interknit with others, a compost heap can more helpfully accommodate memory's inescapably social, communal dimensions. In addition, it may also do better service to the non-rule-following dimension that memory decidedly has. As Draaisma (2000) writes, commenting on the computational paradox: … human memory is an instrument which, if the need arises, lies and deceives. It distorts, sifts, and deforms, takes better care of some things than others. Unlike the computer memory it disobeys commands. It does not bother about instructions to keep one thing and throw something else away. (p. 161) Such comments lend credence to the opinion of Dutch writer Cees Nooteboom that 'memory is like a dog that lies down where it pleases' (as cited in Draaisma, 2000, p. 11) .
To put the point precisely, a compost heap is in the end not a form of technology at all, but is literally alive. As such, it permits a more lively way of valuing how our memory, despite-and perhaps because of-what we forget, can (if tended to better?) be a renewable resource for meaning and wisdom, and for creativity as well, in relation to which terms like 'germination' and 'incubation' take on heightened meaning. 'A novelist,' writes Graham Greene (1973) , for instance, 'has a greater ability to forget than most men ... what he forgets becomes the compost of the imagination' (p. 160). A compost heap also permits us an understanding of memory that perhaps can accommodate emotionality-what one writer (Goldberg, 2005, p. 219) refers to as the 'soft underbelly' of psychology-much better than computation can. 'Data' may think amazingly well, in other words, but feelings come hard, especially intimate, memory-laden ones like melancholy or nostalgia, depression or grief. Ultimately, the compost heap permits us an appreciation of memory that not only is back-to-nature and down-to-earth, if you will, but also comes down in the end on the side of growth and not decline, both our own growth and 628 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(5) others.' Moreover, it offers a means of honoring the social dimension of memory, and the fine line between individual story and collective historyarguably, a compost heap on a grander scale. In effect, then, it clears the way to value the depth dimensions of memory-as of self-and to accept as a fact of human life the always somewhat blurry distinctions between remembering and imagining, individual and communal, conscious and unconscious, present and past, self and other, and ultimately life and death. 'New metaphors,' claim Lakoff and Johnson (1980) , 'have the power to create a new reality' (p. 145). More fully developed, the compost heap has the potential to break new ground in our understanding of what memory is and does. However, my main aim here has merely been to introduce it, not defend it to the finish. While, as Draaisma (2000) says, the computer has clearly 'functioned as a supplier of a new series of terms and comparisons' and has definitely 'introduced "computer-speak" into memory psychology' (p. 159), I am not supposing that compost-speak will overtake us any time soon. Seductive as it is, the compost metaphor, like any metaphor, may filter out as much as it permits us to see; raise as many issues as it resolves; and carry entailments which refuse to reflect neatly the reality at issue-as in this-corresponds-with-this. Admittedly, it, too, takes us only just so far. One wonders, for instance, what would be the counterpart in the machinations of memory of each of the creepy-crawly creatures that inhabit the ordinary compost heap and enable it to thrive: millipedes, nematodes, wood lice, sow bugs, red wigglers, and the like. Also, do women compost differently than men? Do the 'young old' do it differently than the 'old old' (a question of obvious interest to psychologists of aging)? Moreover, how might our composting abilities vary by education, by economic status, by culture? And what is the impact on memory-as-compost when the additional, and tragic, decomposition that is associated with dementia is factored into the mix? Overall, what researchable questions can we posit by means of such a metaphor, and by what methods might we week to answer them? To borrow from Bruner (1962 Bruner ( /1965 , how do we go about 'the forging of metaphoric hunch into testable hypotheses' (p. 5)?
Setting such issues aside, perhaps where their interests in memory are concerned, the various branches of psychology-from gero-psychology to biopsychology, cognitive to social, developmental to depth-can nonetheless discover in the lowly compost heap some needed common ground.
